Do We Perceive Natural Kind Properties?

Philosophical Studies 162 (1):35 - 42 (2013)
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Abstract

I respond to three arguments aimed at establishing that natural kind properties — a kind of high-level properties — occur in the experiential content of visual perceptual experience: the argument from phenomenal difference, the argument from mandatory seeing, and the argument from associative agnosia. I conclude with a simple argument against the view that natural kind properties occur in the experiential content of visual experience.

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Berit Brogaard
University of Miami

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