Abstract
Th e recent revival of Berkeley studies in the last three decades or so make
it interesting to look back at George Santayana’s discussion of Berkeley.
Th ough Santayana understood the latter’s arguments for immaterialism,
he claimed no one could both seriously accept immaterialism, and live, as
Berkeley certainly did, an embodied life. As he writes of Berkeley, “Th is
idealist was no hermit” (205). Santayana claimed that without matter
there was nothing (“no machinery”) for the soul to work on. For a soul
(mind) the machinery consists of material objects including one’s body.
In this, paper, aft er some introductory comments, particularly on some
aspects of early modern philosophy, e.g. the theory of ideas, which Berkeley
largely accepts, and the metaphysics of indirect realism which he rejects,
I look at the issue of human embodiment, and conclude, although
Santayana perhaps misread important aspects of Berkeley’s discussion, he
is largely correct in noting that Berkeley’s idealism/immaterialism can’t
capture the special relation we have to our bodies.