How Chatton Changed Ockham’s Mind

In Gyula Klima (ed.), Intentionality, Cognition and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy. Fordham University Press. pp. 204-234 (2015)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
It is well-known that Chatton is among the earliest and most vehement critics of Ockham’s theory of judgment, but scholars have overlooked the role Chatton’s criticisms play in shaping Ockham’s final account. In this paper, I demonstrate that Ockham’s most mature treatment of judgment not only contains revisions that resolve the problems Chatton identifies in his earlier theories, but also that these revisions ultimately bring his final account of the objects of judgment surprisingly close to Chatton’s own. Even so, I argue that, at the end of the day, there remain significant differences between their respective analyses of the structure and intentionality of judicative states.
Reprint years
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-09-12
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
386 ( #20,025 of 70,145 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
28 ( #30,479 of 70,145 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.