How Chatton Changed Ockham's Mind: William Ockham and Walter Chatton on Objects and Acts of Judgment

In G. Klima (ed.), Intentionality, Cognition and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy. Fordham University Press (2014)
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Abstract
It is well-known that Chatton is among the earliest and most vehement critics of Ockham’s theory of judgment, but scholars have overlooked the role Chatton’s criticisms play in shaping Ockham’s final account. In this paper, I demonstrate that Ockham’s most mature treatment of judgment not only contains revisions that resolve the problems Chatton identifies in his earlier theories, but also that these revisions ultimately bring his final account of the objects of judgment surprisingly close to Chatton’s own. Even so, I argue that, at the end of the day, there remain significant differences between their respective analyses of the structure and intentionality of judicative states.
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