The Myth of Phenomenological Overflow

Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):599-604 (2012)
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Abstract
In this paper I examine the dispute between Hakwan Lau, Ned Block, and David Rosenthal over the extent to which empirical results can help us decide between first-order and higher-order theories of consciousness. What emerges from this is an overall argument to the best explanation against the first-order view of consciousness and the dispelling of the mythological notion of phenomenological overflow that comes with it
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First archival date: 2011-06-05
Latest version: 6 (2019-02-09)
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Conscious, Preconscious, and Subliminal Processing: A Testable Taxonomy.Dehaene, Stanislas; Changeux, Jean-Pierre; Naccache, Lionel; Sackur, Jérôme & Sergent, Claire

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2011-06-05

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