The possibility of morality

Philosophical Studies 163 (3):627-636 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Despite much discussion over the existence of moral facts, metaethicists have largely ignored the related question of their possibility. This paper addresses the issue from the moral error theorist’s perspective, and shows how the arguments that error theorists have produced against the existence of moral facts at this world, if sound, also show that moral facts are impossible, at least at worlds non-morally identical to our own and, on some versions of the error theory, at any world. So error theorists’ arguments warrant a stronger conclusion than has previously been noticed. This may appear to make them vulnerable to counterarguments that take the possibility of moral facts as a premise. However, I show that any such arguments would be question-begging
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BROTPO-43
Revision history
Archival date: 2011-11-08
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
The Myth of Morality.Joyce, Richard

View all 14 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2011-11-08

Total views
596 ( #3,617 of 38,929 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
58 ( #7,109 of 38,929 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.