Eyeballing evil: Some epistemic principles

Philosophical Papers 25 (2):127-137 (1996)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The version uploaded to this site is a late draft. The paper arises both from William L. Rowe's classic 1979 discussion of the problem of evil, argues that there exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse, and also from Steven Wykstra's response, in the course of which he argues for the following Condition of Reasonable Epistemic Access (CORNEA): "On the basis of cognized situation s, human H is entitled to claim 'It appears that p' only if it is reasonable for H to believe that, given her cognitive faculties and the use she has made of them, if p were not the case, s would likely be different in some way discernible by her." My paper discusses CORNEA, and proposes a replacement principle.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BRUEES
Upload history
Archival date: 2021-09-18
View other versions
Added to PP index
2010-08-24

Total views
9 ( #64,142 of 2,448,698 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #63,622 of 2,448,698 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.