Epistemic Internalism and the Challenge from Testimony

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Abstract
In this paper, I spell out a new challenge for epistemic internalism that emerges out of the current debate on testimonial justification. Based on recent developments within this debate, one might argue as follows: Epistemic internalism can’t account for the justification of our testimony-based beliefs, because (1) we should conceive of testimonial justification along anti-reductionist lines and (2) anti-reductionism is incompatible with epistemic internalism. In response to this challenge, I show that, despite initial appearances, epistemic internalism and anti-reductionism are compatible after all. Therefore, being an anti-reductionist with regard to testimonial justification doesn’t force one to reject epistemic internalism. In order to argue for this result, I will make use of resources provided by speech act theory.
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Archival date: 2021-05-24
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2020-09-04

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