Episteme 17 (2):230-248 (
2020)
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Abstract
Under which conditions are we epistemically justied to believe that what
other people tell us is true? Traditionally, the answer has either been reductionist
or anti-reductionist: Either our justication reduces to non-testimonial
reasons, or we have a presumptive, though defeasible, right to believe what we
are told. However, different cases pull in different directions. Intuitively,
someone asking for the time is subject to different epistemic standards than
a surgeon consulting a colleague before a dangerous operation. Following
this line of thought, this paper develops an account of testimonial justication
that captures our reductionist as well as our anti-reductionist intuitions. It
is argued that the speaker’s commitment to an epistemic norm, as well as
the hearer’s understanding of that norm, gives the hearer a presumptive
right to believe what she is told. However, this justication doesn’t apply to
situations with high practical risks. Here, the hearer needs reductive reasons
to believe that her interlocutor is especially qualied to give her the desired
information.