Implicit attitudes and the ability argument

Philosophical Studies:1-30 (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
According to one picture of the mind, decisions and actions are largely the result of automatic cognitive processing beyond our ability to control. This picture is in tension with a foundational principle in ethics that moral responsibility for behavior requires the ability to control it. The discovery of implicit attitudes contributes to this tension. According to the ability argument against moral responsibility, if we cannot control implicit attitudes, and implicit attitudes cause behavior, then we cannot be morally responsible for that behavior. The purpose of this paper is to refute the ability argument. Drawing on both scientific evidence in cognitive science and philosophical arguments in ethics and action theory, I argue that it is invalid and unsound because current evidence is insufficient to establish the premises that implicit attitudes are uncontrollable, that they significantly cause behavior, that responsibility always requires ability, and that even if uncontrollable attitudes did fully cause behavior, this entails that the behavior they cause is uncontrollable. The rejection of the ability argument questions the priority of the unconscious over the conscious mind in cognitive science, deprioritizes ability in theories of moral responsibility in ethics, and provides a strong reason to uphold moral responsibility for implicitly biased behavior.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BUCIAA-2
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-09-26
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 53 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2018-09-15

Total views
27 ( #32,437 of 37,197 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
27 ( #13,195 of 37,197 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.