Learning not to be Naïve: A comment on the exchange between Perrine/Wykstra and Draper

In Trent Dougherty & Justin McBrayer (eds.), Skeptical Theism: New Essays. Oxford University Press (2014)
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Abstract

Does postulating skeptical theism undermine the claim that evil strongly confirms atheism over theism? According to Perrine and Wykstra, it does undermine the claim, because evil is no more likely on atheism than on skeptical theism. According to Draper, it does not undermine the claim, because evil is much more likely on atheism than on theism in general. I show that the probability facts alone do not resolve their disagreement, which ultimately rests on which updating procedure – conditionalizing or updating on a conditional – fits both the evidence and how we ought to take that evidence into account.

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Lara Buchak
Princeton University

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