Abstract

The intuitive, pre-scientific attitude contained in the main theses of scientific realism, that science learns about the world that exists independently of human cognitive acts, turned out to be philosophically problematic. Theses about the truth of scientific theories and the reality of unobservable theoretical objects have been questioned on many levels for various reasons. The discussion between scientific realism and anti-realism leads to a gradual weakening of the position of scientific realism as a result of the difficulties attributed to it. In this context, questions arise about the nature of these difficulties, whether they are related to the main theses of this position or rather to the image of science that constitutes the background of the dispute and the understanding of the concepts in which it is expressed? These issues will be addressed in the context of questions and objections raised against scientific realism and the answers provided by realists. The article presents typical formulations of scientific realism and the main arguments of this position and its counter-arguments. The main realist responses to these problems are also briefly presented. Next, the difficulties arising for realism from the model-theoretic concept of scientific theories were identified and analysed, including the problem of representing real systems in theory models and the problem of idealization common in science. Then, R. Giere’s perspectival realism was briefly discussed as one of realism’s possible responses to these difficulties. The aim of the article was not to present another proposal to solve the difficulties, but to try to understand their nature and source. It seems that they are of a conceptual and interpretive nature and lie mainly in the way of understanding the concept of “truth” in relation to scientific theories. As the analysis shows, the “truthfulness” of a theory is understood as its compliance with reality in the sense of being an exact copy of it, and not in the sense of its ability to provide information about specific aspects of reality. The conclusion includes a suggestion that the understanding of the concept of “truth” in relation to scientific theories should take into account the fact that they are not copies of reality, they do not replace it in knowledge, but are only a tool for learning about some of its aspects. Omitting this fact leads to a discrepancy between the unrealistic expectation of a full reflection of reality in the scientific theory, which is formulated by philosophers, and the knowledge about certain aspects of reality obtained using models or theories, which is accepted by scientists.