In John R. Shook & Tibor Solymosi (eds.), Pragmatist Neurophilosophy: American Philosophy and the Brain. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 177-202 (2014)
AbstractGood old-fashioned cognitive science characterizes human thinking as symbol manipulation qua computation and therefore emphasizes the processing of symbolic representations as a necessary if not sufficient condition for “general intelligent action.” Recent alternative conceptions of human thinking tend to deemphasize if not altogether eschew the notion of representation. The present paper shows how classical American pragmatist conceptions of human thinking can successfully avoid either of these extremes, replacing old-fashioned conceptions of representation with one that characterizes both representatum and representans in externalist terms.
Archival historyArchival date: 2014-06-06
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