Truth-Deflationism and Truth-Theoretic Semantics: One Way to Make Them Clash

Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 79 (3):1067-1072 (2023)
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Deflationism about truth is often said to be incompatible with truth-theoretic semantics. However, both of these labels are ambiguous, making the truth of the incompatibility claim dependent on interpretation. I provide one pair of natural interpretations, on which both views relate essentially to grounding and on which they are indeed incompatible. This result has some intrinsic interest as well as paving the way for further needed clarifications in the debate about the relationship between the views.

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Arvid Båve
University of Lisbon


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