Truth-Predicates Still Not like Pronouns: a Reply to Salis

Philosophia 47 (5):1421-1429 (2019)
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Abstract

I here respond to Pietro Salis’s objections against my original critique of the Prosentential Theory of Truth. In addition, I clarify some points regarding the relationship between anaphoric relationships and “general semantic notions” like “equivalence”, “consequence”, and “sameness of content”, and make some further points about ’s ability gto explain pragmatic and expressive features of “true”.

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Arvid Båve
University of Lisbon

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