Truth-Predicates Still Not like Pronouns: a Reply to Salis

Philosophia 47 (5):1421-1429 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
I here respond to Pietro Salis’s objections against my original critique of the Prosentential Theory of Truth. In addition, I clarify some points regarding the relationship between anaphoric relationships and “general semantic notions” like “equivalence”, “consequence”, and “sameness of content”, and make some further points about ’s ability gto explain pragmatic and expressive features of “true”.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
First archival date: 2019-04-02
Latest version: 3 (2019-05-16)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Making It Explicit.Levi, Isaac & Brandom, Robert B.
Conceptions of Truth.Künne, Wolfgang
A Prosentential Theory of Truth.Grover, Dorothy L.; Camp, Joseph L. & Belnap, Nuel D.

View all 9 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
115 ( #31,030 of 50,371 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
22 ( #26,753 of 50,371 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.