Truth-Predicates Still Not Like Pronouns: A Reply to Salis

Philosophia:1-9 (forthcoming)
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Abstract
I here argue that my original critique of the Prosentential theory of truth (PT) withstands Pietro Salis's recent objections, particularly, my objection that (PT) makes an idle analogy between "true" and proforms, and that the analogy breaks down in several ways.
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First archival date: 2019-04-02
Latest version: 3 (2019-05-16)
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References found in this work BETA
Making It Explicit.Levi, Isaac & Brandom, Robert B.
Conceptions of Truth.Künne, Wolfgang
A Prosentential Theory of Truth.Grover, Dorothy L.; Camp, Joseph L. & Belnap, Nuel D.

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