Rosenthal on mental qualities

In Qualitative Consciousness: Themes from the Philosophy of David Rosenthal. Cambridge University Press (forthcoming)
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Abstract
David Rosenthal couples his higher-order thought theory of consciousness with a theory of “mental qualities”, properties of mental states. The first thesis of this paper is that there are no mental qualities as Rosenthal conceives of them. The second thesis is that Rosenthal’s residual insights are significant. They naturally lead to a simple first-order theory of consciousness.
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Archival date: 2021-05-03
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