Transparency, belief, intention

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This paper elaborates and defends a familiar ‘transparent’ account of knowledge of one's own beliefs, inspired by some remarks of Gareth Evans, and makes a case that the account can be extended to mental states in general, in particular to knowledge of one's intentions.
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Archival date: 2018-11-12
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Doxastic Deliberation.Shah, Nishi & David Velleman, J.

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Citations of this work BETA
Assertion and Transparent Self-Knowledge.Marcus, Eric & Schwenkler, John

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