Whither naive realism? - II

In Ori Beck & Farid Masrour (eds.), The Relational View of Perception: New Essays. Routledge (forthcoming)
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Abstract

In a companion paper (Byrne and Green 2023) we disentangled the main characterizations of naïve realism and argued that illusions provide the best proving ground for naïve realism and its main rival, representationalism. According to naïve realism, illusions never involve perceptual error. We assessed two leading attempts to explain apparent perceptual error away, from William Fish and Bill Brewer, and concluded that they fail. This paper considers another prominent attempt, from Craig French and Ian Phillips, and also sketches the case for representationalism.

Author Profiles

E. J. Green
Johns Hopkins University
Alex Byrne
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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