Do racionalismo ao tradicionalismo: um problema eminente

Ensaios Filosóficos 19:182-198 (2019)
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Abstract
It is still common to find the traditionalist and rationalist conception that scientific knowledge is the most accurate way of describing natural data, as if, therefore, the notion of knowledge were identical to the notion of natural science. In this article, this conception is problematized, based on some concrete cases of the history of science that seem to show that the beliefs of natural science can also be explained on the basis of non-scientific beliefs, such as the beliefs of sociology, psychology, history and philosophy. That is, the main purpose of this paper is to argue that the assessment one can have of scientific clarity can not be constructed only through explanations provided by the procedures of natural science, but also through explanations provided by the procedures of other distinct areas. This argument runs counter to traditionalist rationalism and will be used in this article to criticize the conception that knowledge, in order to be valid, will necessarily have to be scientific and rational.
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