Do theories of implicit race bias change moral judgments?

Social Justice Research 23:272-289 (2010)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Recent work in social psychology suggests that people harbor “implicit race biases,” biases which can be unconscious or uncontrollable. Because awareness and control have traditionally been deemed necessary for the ascription of moral responsibility, implicit biases present a unique challenge: do we pardon discrimination based on implicit biases because of its unintentional nature, or do we punish discrimination regardless of how it comes about? The present experiments investigated the impact such theories have upon moral judgments about racial discrimination. The results show that different theories differ in their impact on moral judgments: when implicit biases are defined as unconscious, people hold the biased agent less morally responsible than when these biases are defined as automatic (i.e., difficult to control), or when no theory of implicit bias is provided.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
CAMDTO
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-03-07
View other versions
Added to PP index
2010-12-26

Total views
514 ( #11,920 of 2,448,889 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
86 ( #6,729 of 2,448,889 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.