Conceptual Engineering: The Master Argument

In Herman Cappelen, David Plunkett & Alexis Burgess (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2020)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
I call the activity of assessing and developing improvements of our representational devices ‘conceptual engineering’.¹ The aim of this chapter is to present an argument for why conceptual engineering is important for all parts of philosophy (and, more generally, all inquiry). Section I of the chapter provides some background and defines key terms. Section II presents the argument. Section III responds to seven objections. The replies also serve to develop the argument and clarify what conceptual engineering is
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
CAPCET
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-08-08
View other versions
Added to PP index
2018-08-08

Total views
552 ( #11,345 of 64,247 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
59 ( #12,441 of 64,247 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.