Artifacts and fiat objects: two families apart?

In Richard Davies (ed.), Natural and Artifactual Objects in Contemporary Metaphysics. Exercises in Analytic Ontology. Londra, Regno Unito: pp. 141-155 (2019)
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Abstract
Fiat objects may come into existence by intentional explicit defnition and convention or they can be the result of some spontaneous and unintentional activity resulting in tracing fat spatial boundaries. Artifacts and fiat objects seem intuitively to be correlated: both artifacts and fiat objects depend for their existence on agents and their intentions. Is it possible to consider fiat objects as artifacts and to what extent? Or else can we conceive at least some artifacts as fiat objects? In order to draw a map of the possible answers to these two questions we will take into account various defnitions of artifacts stemming from the two classical approaches: the intentional and the functional one.
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Archival date: 2019-04-04
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