A Notion of Logical Concept Based on Plural Reference

Acta Analytica 33 (1):19-33 (2018)
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In To be is to be the object of a possible act of choice the authors defended Boolos’ thesis that plural quantification is part of logic. To this purpose, plural quantification was explained in terms of plural reference, and a semantics of plural acts of choice, performed by an ideal team of agents, was introduced. In this paper, following that approach, we develop a theory of concepts that—in a sense to be explained—can be labeled as a theory of logical concepts. Within this theory, we propose a new logicist approach to natural numbers. Then, we compare our logicism with Frege’s traditional logicism.
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Truth and Objectivity.Wright, Crispin
Arbitrary Reference.Breckenridge, Wylie & Magidor, Ofra
Nominalist Platonism.Boolos, George

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