Benefits Are Better than Harms: A Reply to Feit

Australasian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

We have argued that the counterfactual comparative account of harm and benefit (CCA) violates the plausible adequacy condition that an act that would harm an agent cannot leave her much better off than an alternative act that would benefit her. In a recent paper in this journal, however, Neil Feit objects that our argument presupposes questionable counterfactual backtracking. He also argues that CCA proponents can justifiably reject the condition by invoking so-called plural harm and benefit. In this reply, we argue that Feit’s lines of criticism are both unsuccessful.

Author Profiles

Erik Carlson
Uppsala Universitet
Jens Johansson
Uppsala University
Olle Risberg
Uppsala University

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