Beyond the internal realist's conceptual scheme

Metaphilosophy 27 (3):296-301 (1996)
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Abstract

This paper examines Hilary Putnam’s arguments against what he calls metaphysical realism and in favour of internal realism. A key notion is the one of conceptual scheme, whose role is to explain how we inevitably find ourselves adopting one viewpoint among possible others. To ensure the possibility of agreement between all inquirers for some basic issues, is Putnam committed to having just one conceptual scheme for all human inquirers? The paper argues that the answer is no, on condition that all inquirers are assumed to have a kind of cognitive faculty that is common to all.

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Louis Caruana
Pontificia Universita Gregoriana

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