Deep Platonism

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According to the traditional bundle theory, particulars are bundles of compresent universals. I think we should reject the bundle theory for a variety of reasons. But I will argue for the thesis at the core of the bundle theory: that all the facts about particulars are grounded in facts about universals. I begin by showing how to meet the main objection to this thesis (which is also the main objection to the bundle theory): that it is inconsistent with the possibility of distinct qualitative indiscernibles. Here, the key idea appeals to a non-standard theory of haecceities as non-well-founded properties of a certain sort. I will then defend this theory from a number of objections, and finally argue that we should accept it on the basis of considerations of parsimony about the fundamental.
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First archival date: 2014-12-18
Latest version: 10 (2018-06-04)
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References found in this work BETA
Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Themes From Kaplan.Almog, Joseph; Perry, John & Wettstein, Howard (eds.)

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Citations of this work BETA
Object.Rettler, Bradley & Bailey, Andrew M.
Upward Grounding.Dixon, T. Scott
Priority Monism.Trogdon, Kelly
Brute Necessity.Van Cleve, James

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