Disagreement, Relativism and Doxastic Revision

Erkenntnis 79 (S1):1-18 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I investigate the implication of the truth-relativist’s alleged ‘ faultless disagreements’ for issues in the epistemology of disagreement. A conclusion I draw is that the type of disagreement the truth-relativist claims to preserve fails in principle to be epistemically significant in the way we should expect disagreements to be in social-epistemic practice. In particular, the fact of faultless disagreement fails to ever play the epistemically significant role of making doxastic revision rationally required for either party in a disagreement. That the truth-relativists’ disagreements over centred content fail to play this epistemically significant role that disagreements characteristically play in social epistemology should leave us sceptical that disagreement is what the truth-relativist has actually preserved

Author's Profile

J. Adam Carter
University of Glasgow

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-11-10

Downloads
1,057 (#5,924)

6 months
50 (#19,660)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?