Ethical Deception? Responding to Parallel Subjectivities in People Living with Dementia

Disability Studies Quarterly 40 (3) (2020)
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Abstract

Many caregivers feel that they need to lie or withhold the truth from people living with dementia, but worry that, in doing so, they are violating a duty to tell the truth. In this article, I argue that withholding the truth from and, in limited circumstances, lying to people living with dementia is not only morally permissible, but morally required by a more general requirement that we treat each other as persons worthy of respect. I do so through an analysis of the groundings of the duty to tell the truth, and a critical reflection on its cognitively ableist construction.

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Matilda Carter
University of Glasgow

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