Extended Knowledge-How

Erkenntnis 81 (2):259-273 (2016)
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Abstract
According to reductive intellectualists about knowledge-how :147–190, 2008; Philos Phenomenol Res 78:439–467, 2009) knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. To the extent that this is right, then insofar as we might conceive of ways knowledge could be extended with reference to active externalist :7–19, 1998; Clark in Supersizing the mind: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) approaches in the philosophy of mind, we should expect no interesting difference between the two. However, insofar as anti-intellectualist approaches to knowledge-how are a viable option, there is an overlooked issue of how knowledge-how might be extended, via active externalism, in ways very differently from knowledge-that. This paper explores this overlooked space, and in doing so, illustrates how a novel form of extended knowledge-how emerges from a pairing of active externalism in the philosophy of mind with anti-intellectualism in the theory of knowledge. Crucial to our argument will be a new way of thinking about the extended mind thesis, as it pertains to the kinds of state one is in when one knows how to do something, and how this state connects with non-accidentally successful performance
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First archival date: 2015-05-17
Latest version: 3 (2015-05-26)
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
The Bounds of Cognition.Adams, Frederick & Aizawa, Kenneth

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Citations of this work BETA
The Defeasibility of Knowledge-How.Carter, J. Adam & Navarro, Jesús
Googled Assertion.Carter, J. Adam & Gordon, Emma C.

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2015-05-17

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