Epistemic Perceptualism, Skill, and the Regress Problem

Philosophical Studies:1-26 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
A novel solution is offered for how emotional experiences can function as sources of immediate prima facie justification for evaluative beliefs, and in such a way that suffices to halt a justificatory regress. Key to this solution is the recognition of two distinct kinds of emotional skill (what I call generative emotional skill and doxastic emotional skill) and how these must be working in tandem when emotional experience plays such a justificatory role. The paper has two main parts, the first negative and the second positive. The negative part criticises the epistemic credentials of Epistemic Perceptualism (e.g., Tappolet 2012, 2016; Doring 2003, 2007; Elgin 2008; Roberts 2003), the view that emotional experience alone suffices to prima facie justify evaluative beliefs in a way that is analogous to how perceptual experience justifies our beliefs about the external world. The second part of the paper develops an account of emotional skill and uses this account to frame a revisionary form of Epistemic Perceptualism that succeeds where the traditional views could not. I conclude by considering some objections and replies.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
CAREPS
Revision history
Archival date: 2019-01-10
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Knowledge as Credit for True Belief.John Greco - 2003 - In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Clarendon Press. pp. 111-134.

View all 36 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2019-01-10

Total views
80 ( #26,849 of 40,155 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
80 ( #5,708 of 40,155 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.