Human Foreknowledge

Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):50-69 (2021)
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I explore the motivation and logical consequences of the idea that we have some (limited) ability to know contingent facts about the future, even in presence of the assumption that the future is objectively unsettled or indeterminate. I start by formally characterizing skepticism about the future. This analysis nudges the anti-skeptic towards the idea that if some propositions about the future are objectively indeterminate, then it may be indeterminate whether a suitably positioned agent knows them. Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 35, Issue 1, Page 50-69, December 2021.

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Fabrizio Cariani
University of Maryland, College Park


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