Knowledge: Value on the Cheap

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):249-263 (2013)
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ABSTRACT: We argue that the so-called ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ Value Problems for knowledge are more easily solved than is widely appreciated. Pritchard, for instance, has suggested that only virtue-theoretic accounts have any hopes of adequately addressing these problems. By contrast, we argue that accounts of knowledge that are sensitive to the Gettier problem are able to overcome these challenges. To first approximation, the Primary Value Problem is a problem of understanding how the property of being knowledge confers more epistemic value on a belief than the property of being true. The Secondary Value is a problem of understanding how, for instance, property of being knowledge confers more epistemic value on a belief than the property of being jointly true and justified. We argue that attending to the fact that beliefs are ongoing states reveals that there is no difficulty in appreciating how knowledge might ordinarily have more epistemic value than mere true belief or mere justified true belief. We also explore in what ways ordinary cases of knowledge might be of distinctive epistemic value. In the end, our proposal resembles the original Platonic suggestion in the Meno that knowledge is valuable because knowledge is somehow tied to the good of truth.
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Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Epistemic Luck.Pritchard, Duncan

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Varieties of Cognitive Achievement.Carter, J. Adam; Jarvis, Benjamin W. & Rubin, Katherine
Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value.Adam Carter, J. & Pritchard, Duncan
Knowledge and the Value of Cognitive Ability.Carter, J. Adam; Jarvis, Benjamin & Rubin, Katherine

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