On assertion and denial in the logic for pragmatics

Journal of Applied Logic 25:S97-S107 (2017)
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The aim of this paper is twofold: First, we present and develop a system of logic for pragmatics including the act of denial. Second, we analyse in our framework the so-called paradox of assertability. We show that it is possible to yield sentences that are not assertable. Moreover, under certain conditions, a symmetric result can be obtained: There is a specular paradox of deniability. However, this paradox is based on the problematic principle of classical denial equivalence
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The Logic of Paradox.Priest, Graham
Denial and Disagreement.Murzi, Julien & Carrara, Massimiliano
Assertion and Hypothesis: A Logical Framework for Their Opposition Relations.Carrara, Massimiliano; Chiffi, Daniele & De Florio, Ciro

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