On assertion and denial in the logic for pragmatics

Journal of Applied Logic 25:S97-S107 (2017)
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Abstract

The aim of this paper is twofold: First, we present and develop a system of logic for pragmatics including the act of denial. Second, we analyse in our framework the so-called paradox of assertability. We show that it is possible to yield sentences that are not assertable. Moreover, under certain conditions, a symmetric result can be obtained: There is a specular paradox of deniability. However, this paradox is based on the problematic principle of classical denial equivalence

Author Profiles

Massimiliano Carrara
University of Padua
Daniele Chiffi
Politecnico di Milano
Ciro De Florio
Università Cattolica di Milano

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