‘Ought’ and Resolution Semantics

Noûs 47 (3):534-558 (2013)
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Abstract
I motivate and characterize an intensional semantics for ‘ought’ on which it does not behave as a universal quantifier over possibilities. My motivational argument centers on taking at face value some standard challenges to the quantificational semantics, especially to the idea that ‘ought’-sentences satisfy the principle of Inheritance. I argue that standard pragmatic approaches to these puzzles are either not sufficiently detailed or unconvincing.
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References found in this work BETA
Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Counterfactuals.Lewis, David K.
Elusive Knowledge.Lewis, David K.
Ifs and Oughts.Kolodny, Niko & MacFarlane, John

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Citations of this work BETA
Bounded Modality.Mandelkern, Matthew
Deliberative Modality Under Epistemic Uncertainty.Cariani, Fabrizio; Kaufmann, Magdalena & Kaufmann, Stefan

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