Openmindedness and truth

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):207-224 (2014)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
While openmindedness is often cited as a paradigmatic example of an intellectual virtue, the connection between openmindedness and truth is tenuous. Several strategies for reconciling this tension are considered, and each is shown to fail; it is thus claimed that openmindedness, when intellectually virtuous, bears no interesting essential connection to truth. In the final section, the implication of this result is assessed in the wider context of debates about epistemic value
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2014-04-25
Latest version: 2 (2014-04-25)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
1,299 ( #4,201 of 72,588 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
88 ( #8,002 of 72,588 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.