Openmindedness and truth

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):207-224 (2014)
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While openmindedness is often cited as a paradigmatic example of an intellectual virtue, the connection between openmindedness and truth is tenuous. Several strategies for reconciling this tension are considered, and each is shown to fail; it is thus claimed that openmindedness, when intellectually virtuous, bears no interesting essential connection to truth. In the final section, the implication of this result is assessed in the wider context of debates about epistemic value

Author Profiles

J. Adam Carter
University of Glasgow
Emma C. Gordon
University of Glasgow


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