On the Epistemology of the Precautionary Principle

Erkenntnis 80 (1):1-13 (2015)
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Abstract
In this paper we present two distinctly epistemological puzzles that arise for one who aspires to defend some plausible version of the precautionary principle. The first puzzle involves an application of contextualism in epistemology; and the second puzzle concerns the task of defending a plausible version of the precautionary principle that would not be invalidated by de minimis
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Archival date: 2014-02-12
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