Si può spiegare un’identità?

Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio 1:31-5 (2018)
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Abstract

In this paper we reconstruct an argument, based on the observations of David Lewis and Jaegwon Kim, according to which, given that identities are necessary, they cannot be grounded; and given that they cannot be grounded, they cannot be explained either. We argue against two key premises of this argument. Furthermore, we present two counterexamples, in the form of two alleged sets of cases of explanation of identities. This argument against the explanation of identities is instrumental for a wider discussion about the nature of explanation itself, in relation with other notions of recent philosophical interest such as grounding.

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Massimiliano Carrara
University of Padua

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