The Epistemology of Cognitive Enhancement

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Abstract
A common epistemological assumption in contemporary bioethics held b y both proponents and critics of non-traditional forms of cognitive enhancement is that cognitive enhancement aims at the facilitation of the accumulation of human knowledge. This paper does three central things. First, drawing from recent work in epistemology, a rival account of cognitive enhancement, framed in terms of the notion of cognitive achievement rather than knowledge, is proposed. Second, we outline and respond to an axiological objection to our proposal that draws from recent work by Leon Kass (2004), Michael Sandel (2009), and John Harris (2011) to the effect that ‘enhanced’ cognitive achievements are (by effectively removing obstacles to success) not worthy of pursuit, or are otherwise ‘trivial’. Third, we show how the cognitive achievement account of cognitive enhancement proposed here fits snugly with recent active externalist approaches (e.g., extended cognition) in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science.
Reprint years
2017, 2019
PhilPapers/Archive ID
CARTEO-58
Revision history
Archival date: 2016-08-05
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References found in this work BETA
The Extended Mind.Clark, Andy & Chalmers, David J.
Knowledge‐How and Epistemic Luck.Carter, J. Adam & Pritchard, Duncan

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Citations of this work BETA
Varieties of Cognitive Integration.Carter, J. Adam & Kallestrup, Jesper

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2016-08-05

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