The Simulation Hypothesis and the Crisis of Epistemological Certainty

Abstract

This paper examines how accepting the simulation hypothesis as a serious philosophical proposition forces a fundamental reconsideration of epistemological certainty. While previous work has focused on the probability of living in a simulation or the nature of consciousness within simulations, we demonstrate that the mere possibility of simulated reality creates a unique crisis for knowledge hierarchies that differs fundamentally from traditional sceptical arguments. Unlike Cartesian doubt, which preserves the notion of an objective reality while questioning our access to it, the simulation hypothesis suggests reality itself might be programmatically mutable. We argue this undermines traditional distinctions between scientific and religious epistemology, creates an insoluble verification paradox for scientific methodology, and requires a radical reimagining of knowledge and truth. While we suggest that complete epistemological scepticism might be avoided through appeal to necessary logical primitives, we conclude that accepting the possibility of simulated reality requires a fundamental reconstruction of how we understand knowledge, scientific practice, and the relationship between competing explanatory frameworks.

Author's Profile

Stephen Carr
Central Methodist College

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2024-11-18

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