Vague Composition Without Vague Existence

Noûs 45 (2):315-327 (2011)
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Abstract
David Lewis (1986) criticizes moderate views of composition on the grounds that a restriction on composition must be vague, and vague composition leads, via a precisificational theory of vagueness, to an absurd vagueness of existence. I show how to resist this argument. Unlike the usual resistance, however, I do not jettison precisificational views of vagueness. Instead, I blur the connection between composition and existence that Lewis assumes. On the resulting view, in troublesome cases of vague composition, there is an object, which definitely exists, about which it is vague whether the relevant borderline parts compose it.
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First archival date: 2014-08-16
Latest version: 6 (2018-06-02)
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References found in this work BETA
Vagueness.Williamson, Timothy
Parthood.Sider, Theodore
Material Beings.van Inwagen, Peter

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Citations of this work BETA
Composition.Korman, Daniel Z. & Carmichael, Chad

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