Vague Composition Without Vague Existence

Noûs 45 (2):315-327 (2011)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
David Lewis (1986) criticizes moderate views of composition on the grounds that a restriction on composition must be vague, and vague composition leads, via a precisificational theory of vagueness, to an absurd vagueness of existence. I show how to resist this argument. Unlike the usual resistance, however, I do not jettison precisificational views of vagueness. Instead, I blur the connection between composition and existence that Lewis assumes. On the resulting view, in troublesome cases of vague composition, there is an object, which definitely exists, about which it is vague whether the relevant borderline parts compose it.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
CARVCW
Upload history
First archival date: 2014-08-16
Latest version: 6 (2018-06-02)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2010-02-08

Total views
1,425 ( #2,003 of 53,729 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
76 ( #7,425 of 53,729 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.