Episteme 9 (4):311-328 (2012)
AbstractMany philosophers accept a view – what I will call the intuition picture – according to which intuitions are crucial evidence in philosophy. Recently, Williamson has argued that such views are best abandoned because they lead to a psychologistic conception of philosophical evidence that encourages scepticism about the armchair judgements relied upon in philosophy. In this paper I respond to this criticism by showing how the intuition picture can be formulated in such a way that: it is consistent with a wide range of views about not only philosophical evidence but also the nature of evidence in general, including Williamson's famous view that E = K; it can maintain the central claims about the nature and role of intuitions in philosophy made by proponents of the intuition picture; it does not collapse into Williamson's own deflationary view of the nature and role of intuitions in philosophy; and it does not lead to scepticism.
Archival historyArchival date: 2013-11-29
View all versions
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.How can I increase my downloads?