Intellectualism and Testimony

Analysis 77 (2):1-9 (2017)
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Abstract
Knowledge-how often appears to be more difficult to transmit by testimony than knowledge-that and knowledge-wh. Some philosophers have argued that this difference provides us with an important objection to intellectualism—the view that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that. This article defends intellectualism against these testimony-based objections.
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Archival date: 2017-06-03
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References found in this work BETA
Knowing How.Stanley, Jason & Willlamson, Timothy
Knowledge‐How and Epistemic Luck.Carter, J. Adam & Pritchard, Duncan

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Knowing How.Cath, Yuri

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2017-06-03

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