Why Care About Non-Natural Reasons?

American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2):125-134 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Are non-natural properties worth caring about? I consider two objections to metaethical non-naturalism. According to the intelligibility objection, it would be positively unintelligible to care about non-natural properties that float free from the causal fabric of the cosmos. According to the ethical idlers objection, there is no compelling motivation to posit non-natural normative properties because the natural properties suffice to provide us with reasons. In both cases, I argue, the objection stems from misunderstanding the role that non-natural properties play in the non-naturalist's understanding of normativity. The role of non-natural properties is not to be responded to, but to "mark" which natural properties it is correct for us to respond to in certain ways.
No keywords specified (fix it)
Reprint years
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-05-30
View other versions
Added to PP

672 (#10,776)

6 months
64 (#11,597)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?