Animals, the beautiful creatures of God in the Stoic and especially in Porphyry’s sense, need to be treated as rational. We
know that the Stoics ask for justice for all rational beings, but there is no significant proclamation from their side
that openly talks in favour of animal justice. They claim the rationality of animals but do not confer any rights to
human beings. The later Neo-Platonist philosopher Porphyry magnificently deciphers this idea in his writing On
Abstinence from Animal Food. Aristotle’s successor Theophrastus thinks that both animals and humans are made up of
the same tissues, and like a human, animals also have the same way of perception, reasoning and appetites.
My next effort would be to decipher how Porphyry illustrates Theophrastus’ perspective not in the way (the technical
theory of justice) the Stoics argued. Porphyry’s stance seems more humanistic that looks for the pertinent reasons for
treating animal rights from the contention of justice that Aristotle, in his early writings, defied since animals can deal
with reasons. The paper highlights how much we could justificatorily demand empathetic concern for animals
from the outlook of the mentioned Greek thinkers and the modern animal rights thinkers as quasi-right of animals, even
if my position undertakes the empathetic ground for animals in an undeserving humanitarian way.