Abstract
This paper begins to examine different interpretations of causa sui as the
key notion used by Strawson to argue for the impossibility of ultimate moral
responsibility. Descartes’ and Spinoza’s interpretations are representative
in understanding the notion of causa sui. Strawson is, I think, on the side of
Descartes. If causa sui can be interpreted differently from the way in which
Strawson did, the idea of moral responsibility would change. I shall here
examine Spinoza’s notion of causa sui, which is an alternative approach to
Strawson’s, for leading to the possibility of moral responsibility. The Chinese
concept of the Supreme Polarity (taiji) can be interpreted as a foundation of
self-determination when philosophically comparing it with Spinoza’s idea
of causa sui, which means an immanent and efficient cause. In the Chinese
context, the ontological account of an agent explains how and why persons
actively participate in the ordering of the world in the Confucian way of life.
Based upon this, I will attempt to examine the idea of moral responsibility
with the notion of taking responsibility for oneself or, as I will call it, “selfassignment”, and consider how the role a person plays might contribute to
understanding the relationship between free will and moral responsibility. In
other words, the ontological claim that the unitary principle of Heaven-andEarth is innately immanent in each person seems to endorse the possibility of
ultimate responsibility even though the teleological commitment to making the
world better implies the absence of free will. This is one of the alternative ways
that we can take moral responsibility without free will.