‘Does Epistemic Naturalism vindicate Semantic Externalism?’- An Episto-semantical Review’
RAVENSHAW JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 3:27-37 (2017)
Abstract
The paper concentrates how could the acceptance of radical naturalism
in Quine’s theory of meaning escorts Quine to ponder the naturalized
epistemology. W.V. Quine was fascinated about the evidential acquisition of
scientific knowledge, and language as a vehicle of knowledge takes a significant
role in his regimented naturalistic theory that is anchored in the scientific
framework. My point is that there is an interesting shift from epistemology to
language (semantic externalism).
The rejection of the mentalist approach on meaning vindicates external
that somehow pave the way for ‘semantic holism’, a thesis where the meaning
of a sentence is defined in turns to the totality of nodes and paths of its semantic
networks where the meaning of linguistic units depend upon the meaning of the
entire language. I would like to relook on Quine’s heart throbbing claim about
the co-extensiveness of the sentential relation and the evidential relation that
point towards an affirmation of meaning holism and semantic externalism.
Besides, the knowledge of acquaintance that relinquishes the singular thought
from the account of psychological consideration and self-knowledge hypothesis
copes up with the testimonial and warrant knowledge entangling by the claims
of social-knowledge as anticipated by Alvin Goldman. My conclusion would be
nearer to the stance of semantic externalism inculcated by the social knowledge
(in epistemic sense) and semantic holism.
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