Decision-theoretic relativity in deontic modality

Linguistics and Philosophy 41 (3):251-287 (2018)
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Abstract
This paper explores the idea that a semantics for ‘ought’ should be neutral between different ways of deciding what an agent ought to do in a situation. While the idea is, I argue, well-motivated, taking it seriously leads to surprising, even paradoxical, problems for theorizing about the meaning of ‘ought’. This paper describes and defends one strategy—a form of Expressivism for the modal ‘ought’—for navigating these problems.
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Archival date: 2018-02-24
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Impassioned Belief.Ridge, Michael
Knowledge and Action.Hawthorne, John & Stanley, Jason

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