Fittingness: The sole normative primitive

Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):684 - 704 (2012)
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Abstract
This paper draws on the 'Fitting Attitudes' analysis of value to argue that we should take the concept of fittingness (rather than value) as our normative primitive. I will argue that the fittingness framework enhances the clarity and expressive power of our normative theorising. Along the way, we will see how the fittingness framework illuminates our understanding of various moral theories, and why it casts doubt on the Global Consequentialist idea that acts and (say) eye colours are normatively on a par. We will see why even consequentialists, in taking rightness to be in some sense determined by goodness, should not think that rightness is conceptually reducible to goodness. Finally, I will use the fittingness framework to explicate the distinction between consequentialist and deontological theories, with particular attention to the contentious case of Rule Consequentialism.
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Archival date: 2012-09-21
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References found in this work BETA
The Moral Problem.Smith, Michael
What We Owe to Each Other.Scanlon, Thomas M.
Reasons and Persons.Margolis, Joseph

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Citations of this work BETA
What is Reasoning?McHugh, Conor & Way, Jonathan
The Game of Belief.Maguire, Barry & Woods, Jack
Fitting Belief.McHugh, Conor

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