On Alethic Functionalism’s (Absurdly?) Wide Applicability

Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):29-39 (2016)
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Abstract

Alethic functionalism, as propounded by Michael Lynch, is the view that there are different ways to be true, but that these differences nevertheless contain enough unity to forestall outright pluralism. This view has many virtues. Yet, since one could conceivably apply Lynch’s “one and many” strategy to other debates, I try to show how his argumentative steps can be used to solve — not just the controversy pertaining to truth — but any controversy that surrounds a “What is X?” question.

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Marc Champagne
Kwantlen Polytechnic University

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