On Alethic Functionalism’s (Absurdly?) Wide Applicability

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Alethic functionalism, as propounded by Michael Lynch, is the view that there are different ways to be true, but that these differences nevertheless contain enough unity to forestall outright pluralism. This view has many virtues. Yet, since one could conceivably apply Lynch’s “one and many” strategy to other debates, I try to show how his argumentative steps can be used to solve — not just the controversy pertaining to truth — but any controversy that surrounds a “What is X?” question.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2016-06-03
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
167 ( #24,679 of 50,165 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
25 ( #24,608 of 50,165 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.