Rethinking the Asymmetry

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):167-177 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to the Asymmetry, we’ve strong moral reason to prevent miserable lives from coming into existence, but no moral reason to bring happy lives into existence. This procreative asymmetry is often thought to be part of commonsense morality, however theoretically puzzling it might prove to be. I argue that this is a mistake. The Asymmetry is merely prima facie intuitive, and loses its appeal on further reflection. Mature commonsense morality recognizes no fundamental procreative asymmetry. It may recognize some superficially similar theses, but we will see that they derive from more familiar principles, and are compatible with there being moral reason to bring happy lives into existence.

Author's Profile

Richard Y. Chappell
University of Miami

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-10-03

Downloads
624 (#35,003)

6 months
131 (#34,138)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?