The Meaning of Imperatives

Philosophy Compass 9 (8):540-555 (2014)
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This article surveys a range of current views on the semantics of imperatives, presenting them as more or less conservative with respect to the Truth-Conditional Paradigm in semantics. It describes and critiques views at either extreme of this spectrum: accounts on which the meaning of an imperative is a modal truth-condition, as well as various accounts that attempt to explain imperative meaning without making use of truth-conditions. It briefly describes and encourages further work on a family of views lying somewhere in the middle. On such views, an imperative will semantically determine, without having as its meaning, a modal truth-condition, which figures centrally in accounting for various aspects of its meaning.
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Archival date: 2014-08-08
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References found in this work BETA
Semantics in Generative Grammar.Heim, Irene & Kratzer, Angelika
Ifs and Oughts.Kolodny, Niko & MacFarlane, John

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Proceedings of Sinn Und Bedeutung 9.Maier, Emar; Bary, Corien & Huitink, Janneke (eds.)

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